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NOTES
THE NEW MANDATE OF THE CORPORATE
LAWYER AFTER THE FALL OF ENRON AND
THE ENACTMENT OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY

ACT
ChristinaR. Salem*
"Until we see a CEO and general counsel march off togetherfor a long, uncomfortable and no-country club sentence-capitalism
is at risk, because people are losing confidence."
- Tom Stickel, Chairman, California Chamber of Commerce
INTRODUCTION

In just a brief period of time, a growing list of accounting
scandals have shaken public and investor faith in corporate
America, while simultaneously triggering the nose-dive of the stock
market.' In light of the string of recent corporate financial crisis
events that have transpired, the collapse of the Enron Corporation,
the overstatement of WorldCom's earnings by over $3.8 billion, 2
*

J.D., Fordham University School of Law, May 2003.

B.B.A. Finance and

International Business, The George Washington University, May 2000. Many
thanks to my family for continuing to unquestionably support me throughout the
years.
1. See Abraham C. Reich & Michelle T. Wirtner, What Do You Do When
Confronted With Client Fraud?,12-Ocr Bus. L. TODAY 39, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 39.
2. See Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WoldCom Says It Hid Expenses,
Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al. On the day
WorldCom announced its accounting adjustment, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt
announced an order under which CEOs and CFOs of approximately 950
companies were to submit sworn statements attesting to the accuracy of past
company filings with the SEC when these companies filed their next reports
before August 14, 2002 and further announced that he "was mad as hell and
wasn't going to take it any more." Paul S. Maco, Adapting to the "New Corporate
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and its subsequent corporate meltdown, one question remains
lingering: where were the corporate lawyers? Lawyers, publicly
perceived as having "deep pockets," are becoming attractive
targets of accountability, in addition to accountants and business
advisors, when a business runs afoul of the law.'
This Note will discuss the new mandate of corporate lawyers in
light of recent corporate scandals and the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sarbanes-Oxley"). 4 Part I will highlight the
general public dissatisfaction with the legal profession as a result of
corporate lawyer involvement with, and lack of disclosure of
ongoing unethical corporate behavior. Part II will compare the
traditional understanding of the American corporate lawyer's role
as that of the governing class, with those scholars who have made
significant contributions to the field of business ethics, including
Tom Dunfee, Tom Donaldson and Tim Fort.
Part III will discuss the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley as a
Congressional mechanism of expanding the scope of corporate
lawyer liability when corporate lawyers fail to disclose a corporate
client's unethical conduct. Part IV will discuss the newly mandated
role of the corporate lawyer in light of Sarbanes-Oxley, and how
Congress is beginning to redefine such role to comport with
traditional American governing class notions and ideologies of
business ethics. The conclusion will highlight that as a result of the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, there will become an inevitable
resurfacing of the tension between the corporate lawyer's role as
defender of common good and communal values, as evidenced by
the traditional understandings of governing class and business
ethics, and the presently accepted role of the corporate lawyer as
that of hired-gun.

Order" and the Personalization of Corporate Responsibility, 21 No. 10 OF
(2002).

COUNSEL 8

3. See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 1, at 39.
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2003).
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CORPORATE LAWYER INVOLVEMENT IN RECENT CORPORATE
SCANDALS

The amount of negative publicity surrounding the role
corporate lawyers played in the Enron debacle has fueled public
distrust with the corporate legal profession.' Highly publicized
transaction work of blue chip law firms, such as Vinson & Elkins
and Kirkland & Ellis, has forced the issue of a corporate lawyer's
duty to disclose corporate wrongdoing into the spotlight.' From
1997 through 2001, Vinson & Elkins handled transactions involving
off-balance sheet Enron partnerships that are now the focus of the
dispute surrounding Enron's collapse Kirkland & Ellis did not
represent Enron, but the firm faces lawsuits from shareholders and
investors who allege tht these off-sheet partnerships consisted of
sham transactions and parties created to conceal Enron debt.8
While the public has a long-term documented distrust of the
legal profession,9 the fallout of recent corporate entities has made,
quite predictably, the public, particularly the government, more
willing to hold corporate lawyers accountable for failing to disclose
material information implicating corporate agents of corporate
wrongdoing." Against this backdrop of public hostility towards
5.

See John K. Villa, How Will Recent Changes in Corporate Governance,

Public Auditing, and the Role of In-House Counsel Affect You?, 20 No. 9 ACCA
DOCKET 124 (2002) (noting that public attention is now focused on the adequacy

of the financial reporting system and disclosure, and of corporate governance and
ethics).
6.

See Ellen Pollack, Lawyers for Enron Faulted its Deals, Didn't Force

Issue, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2002, at 1, 18.
7. See id.
8.
See id
9.
See Cliff Martin & T. Karena Dees, The Truth About Truthfulness: The
Proposed Commentary to Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 15
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 777, 779 (2002);"Judith L. Maute, Colloquium: What Does
It Mean to Proactice Law "In the Interests of Justice" in the Twenty-First
Century?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.1745, 1756 (2002); Christine V. Williams, Ethics

Year in Review, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1159, 1170 (2001).
10. See Villa, supra note 5, at 124 (explaining that the flurry of action on
Capitol Hill is attributed to the publicity surrounding the collapse of Enron and
the events involving WorldCom). It is worth noting that approximately twenty
years ago, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania introduced legislation,
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lawyers, there exists a body of ethical codes, promulgated primarily
to maintain public confidence in the legal profession."
The
underlying goals of these codes it to instill a mechanism of selfregulation, far removed from federal government policing,
whereby disciplinary measures are instilled to ensure that the
public is protected from unethical practitioners."
The recent abundance of corporate mischief may now make it
clear that lawyers are no longer capable of policing themselves and
are in need of legislative oversight.'" However, at one point, such
supervision would have been regarded as ludicrous, for the public's
first encounter with the legal profession entailed utmost
admiration, respect and trust. 4

although never enacted into law, titled "Lawyers Duty of Disclosure Act of 1983"
which obligated lawyers to disclose prospective crimes of their clients, in addition
to prior crimes in the commission of which the client misappropriated legal
advise, to law enforcement authorities. See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 1.
Similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, those lawyers who failed to make the requisite
disclosures would have faced federal criminal liability. See id.
11. See Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Comment, Changingthe Nature of Corporate
Representation: Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of
FiduciaryDuty, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 213, 221 (1996).
12. See id. at 221.
13. See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 1, at 39 (stating that the legal profession
is in danger of losing its right of self-governance); Brian P. Kane, The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002: Somethingfor Everyone to Worry About, 45-OCr ADVOCATE
(IDAHO) 16, Oct. 2002 (noting that Congress will continue to look over the
shoulders of corporate lawyers more aggressively until their professional

independence is completely eroded); James Podgers, Seeking the Best Route, 88Ocr. A.B.A. J. 68 (2002) (quoting SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt when he stated
that "Sarbanes-Oxley reflects some skepticism about the degree to which the
legal profession can police itself, by making explicit the commission's ability, and
our obligation, to regulate how lawyers Appear and practice before us, including
minimum standards of professional conduct for corporate lawyers.").
14. See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers As America's Governing Class: The
Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American
Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 381 (2001) (noting that
lawyers maintained a higher commitment to the public good than any other
profession, permitting them to manage the relationship between law, power and
society).
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TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE CORPORATE LAWYER

AND BUSINESS ETHICS

A. Lawyers As America's Governing Class
The original classification of the American lawyer's role was
that of above self-interest, for lawyers were considered uniquely
qualified to discern, establish and pursue the public common
good. 5 At the heart of this view was republicanism, the dominant
Revolution.16
American
the
fueling
view
ideological
Republicanism advocated the protection of individual liberty
through the collective pursuit of the common good. 7 A necessity
to the republican government was a group of independent and
disinterested citizens who would exchange the pursuit of selfThe framers of the
interest for that of public welfare.
Constitution sought to appoint such powers to a virtuous political
elite, free from legislative power, the interests of the market, and a
profession which pressured its members to accumulate wealth.
The Framers determined that lawyers, who were dedicated to
the common good, and who were placed at the center of commerce
and governance, would be perfectly suited to encompass this
emerging class.' As scientists of justice, lawyers were considered
wholesome in all their virtues, for without greatness in character,
there would be no greatness in the law.2 Reigning as America's
15. See Russell G. Pearce, Historical Perspectives on Pro Bono Lawyering:
The Lawyer and Public Service, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 171, 171
(2001).
See Pearce, supra note 14, at 383.
16.
17.
See William Michael Treanor, Taking the FramersSeriously, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1016, 1033 (1988).
18. See Pearce, supra note 14, at 385 (citing GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION

OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 68 (North Carolina 1969)).
19. See id. at 385-86.
20. See id. at 383 (noting that the legal profession was better equipped for
political leadership).
See id. at 389 (referencing DAVID HOFFMAN, COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY
21.
(J. Neal 2d ed. 1836) who reasoned that "greatness in law required greatness in
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governing class, the main pursuit of lawyers was that of ensuring
the enforcement of the rule of law.22 Specifically, lawyers were to
promote respect for the judicial branch, guard against legislation
that benefited one societal class over another, and ensure that the
majority rule did not suppress individual property and contract
rights.'
At the crux of the governing lawyer's agenda is to
guarantee that the common good trumps financial self-interest. 24
The governing class, however, was not reserved for mere
public welfare advocacy.25' Lawyers were encouraged to represent
the interests of individuals within society, with of course, a goal
towards promoting the common good.26 In fact, lawyers were
perceived as uniquely positioned to exert governing class
community goals upon their clients. ' Private corporations, in
exchange for state charter rights, were expected to yield certain
benefits upon the state and lawyers were viewed as perfect
facilitators of this exchange.' America's governing class were to
exert influence on both clients and the greater society by yielding
coexistence between obligations of representing clients, advocacy
and governance.29 Zealous advocacy was to occur within the
confines of governing class obligations." Where, however, agendas
every virtue" as the attribute enabling lawyers to fulfill their governing class
role).
22. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 171 (noting that such perspective was the
central ideology of both republicanism, the prevailing ideology of the legal elite
in the nineteenth century, as well as professionalism, the prevailing ideology of
the legal elite in the twentieth century).

23.

See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal

Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992).
24. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 173.
25. See Pearce, supra note 14, at 383.
26. See Pearce, supra note 23, at 255.
27. See Pearce, supra note 14, at 383.
28. See Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and Global Capitalism, 38
AM. Bus. L.J. 215, 235 (2001).
29. See Pearce, supra note 14, at 383.
30. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 172 (noting that the governing class ideology
can be traced to Alexis De Tocqueville's classification of lawyers as American
aristocracy, George Sharswood's republican notion of lawyers as providing the
enlightened political leadership which protects "life, liberty, and property," Louis
Brandeis's contention that lawyers are to assume their rightful place as the
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conflicted, the lawyer was to unquestionably uphold her duty to the
common good. 1
Although revered as the dominant ideology of its time, the
governing class movement did not go unchallenged. 2 The latter
half of the nineteenth century gave rise to a wave of criticism, both
inside and outside the legal community, as to whether lawyers were
properly fulfilling their governing class obligations.33
Those
challenging the idea of governing class did so on the grounds that
lawyers should be exclusively labeled as zealous advocates, arguing
that self-interested lawyers would be uncommitted to the common
good.3" The demise .of the governing class role became apparent,
with lawyers beginning to place their financial self-interest above
that of the common good.
Saddened by the transformation from a legal profession to a
mere business, lawyers were being perceived as business men,
"people's lawyers," and Anthony Kronman's plea for lawyers to fulfill their
obligations as lawyer-statesmen).
31. See Pearce, supra note 14, at 383
32.

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 110

(Simon & Schuster 2d ed. 1985); Pearce, supra note 14, at 392-93 (noting that the
legislature began to override bar and judicial regulation of admission to practice
law by easing admission requirements dramatically, and explaining that those
who viewed lawyers as self-interested contributed significantly to the new
legislative changes).
33. See Pearce, supra note 14, at 392.
34. See id. at 393-95. The role of zealous advocate could perhaps be best
summarized by Lord Henry Brougham, leader of those in the House of Lords
who were defending Queen Caroline against King George IV's charges of
adultery, who declared in 1820 that:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients,
and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and among them to himself, is his
first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm,
the torments, the destruction he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of
a patriot from that of advocate, he must go on, reckless of consequences:
though it should be his unhappy lot to involve his country in confusion.
Id. at 394 (citing GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 75

(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (quoting Brougham)).
35. See supra Part II.A (discussing the traditional role of lawyers as Ameria's
governing class, primarily in charge of pursuing the common good over that of
self-interest).
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selling stocks, bonds, brokering deals and negotiating lucrative
business transactions. 36 To further capitalize on individual wealth,
lawyers began to solely advocate for the maximum benefit of their
clients as a means of securing future business.' In seeking to serve
big corporations, their sense of duty to the common good became
inevitably blurred.38 Gone was the established duty to the general
public, and in its place arose the accepted role of the corporate
lawyer as hired gun."
The demise of the governing class role is evident, for lawyers
are no longer classified as disinterested, neutral professionals,
detached from the interests of their clients. No longer commanded
to discern and pursue the public good, the lawyer as hired gun,
particularly the corporate lawyer, stands as advocate of private
interest and big business.' Yet, although the corporate lawyer is
no longer obligated to pursue the good of the people, business
ethicists have yet to abandon the underlying principles of the
governing class. Although she is a hired gun, the corporate lawyer
is operating within an entity which must nonetheless adhere to a
community mandated structure of corporate social responsibility. '
Business ethicists have carved a special ethical role for
corporations within the community, 2 and corporate lawyers, by
default, must tailor their roles to conform.

36. Pearce, supra note 14, at 396 (quoting John R. Dos Passos).
37. See Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy:
Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv.
503, 544 (1985).
38. See Pearce, supra note 14, at 397 (noting that lawyers have become
"captives" of their clients, rather than servants of the public good).
39. See Nelson, supra note 37, at 527-27 (noting that "it is unrealistic to think
of corporate lawyers as neutral professionals who are detached from the
substantive interests of their clients.").
40. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1243-44, 1253-54 (1995).
41. See generally Mayer, supra note 28.
42. See id.
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B. The Special Ethics of Business
Corporate lawyers employed by corporations owe their duty of
loyalty to the corporation as an entity, not to its corporate agents. 3
Tangibles allow one to easily identify the corporate entity:
established suppliers, stockholders, employees and property
locations all serving as the sum of the entity's whole.
Notwithstanding its seemingly physical nature, unearthing the
essence of a corporation, its moral center, has been problematic for
those in the field of business ethics.44
Lacking in a unified theory by both scholars and practitioners,
business ethicists are still searching for conformity with which a
discipline for corporate social responsibility can be adhered to45 .
Consequently, metaphors of perceived business roles inevitably
ensue, such as the business as community, or business as a
mediating institution. 6
Scholars posing these theories view
businesses and corporations as engines of moral societal norms, all
sharing in the concept of "community" as a fundamental element
in understanding and developing sound corporate ethics.47
Leading contributors to the field of business ethics are Tom
Dunfee and Tom Donaldson. 8 They argue that individual
businesses, working groups within such businesses, or a wider
consortium of businesses with shared interest, could form a
community with "authentic moral norms. 4 9
Dunfee and
Donaldson introduced the doctrine of "Integrative Social Contract
Theory" ("ISCT") which calls on managers and corporate
enterprises to examine the customs and mores of a particular
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (1983) (stating that a lawyer
representing an entity does not become the lawyer for any of the entity's
members, agents, officers, or other constituents, but rather represents the entity
itself).
44.

See Mayer, supra note 28, at 222-23.

45. See id.
46. See id. at 223 (explaining that because the moral center of a corporation
is so difficult to locate, it is a stretch to identify the "personality" of a
corporation, as one would identify the "personality" of an individual).
47. See generally id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 216.
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community to discover practical ethical norms for corporations."
Rather than attempting to apply abstract moral theories to
prevalent ethical dilemmas, such as Utilitarianism, Kantian
Deontology, or Aristotelian Eudiamonism, ISCT calls for a closer
look and application of rules and standards already operating
within existing communities.' Precisely because the moral crux of
a corporate entity is practically impossible to locate, an analysis of
business ethics is incomplete without a proper understanding of the
organizational context in which corporate behavior takes place.52
Along similar lines, Tim Fort has introduced the notion that
businesses should transform into "mediating institutions" where
morality is best learned. 3 Suggesting that a free society is in need
of a medium to facilitate social justice and a flourishing free
market, Fort characterizes mediating institutions as structures
between individuals and the greater society.'
Specifically, the
presence of mediating institutions foster societal recognition of
community, reciprocity, solidarity, and the realization of selfinterest through the concern for others.
Businesses as mediating institutions generate well-needed
formulations of stakeholder theory and laws on fiduciary duties of
corporate agents. 6
Recognizing that work has become an
inextricable element of daily life, Fort claims that the necessity to
mold corporations into mediating institutions is self-evident.'
Noting that the unyielding pursuit of material happiness has fueled
social and moral decline, Fort recognizes that mediating
institutions are becoming phased out. 8 Societal norms may be
50. See id. at 216-17.
51. See id. at 222.
52. Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An
OrganizationalPerspective on Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 489,

574-75 (1996).
53.

See Mayer, supra note 28, at 217.

54. See id. at 223 (providing examples of mediating institutions, including
families, guilds, volunteer organizations or religious groups).

55. Id.
56. See id. at 225.
57. See id. at 223.
58. See id. at 225 (noting that "the current legal/economic structures are
working against the transformation of corporate business into mediating
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working against the transformation of corporate business into
mediating institutions, for the influence of the lucrative corporate
culture has led to the ever-increasing consumption of material and
financial growth." The explosion of executive pay was a result of
social change permitting enhanced financial wealth, rather than
pure economic forces of supply and demand. 6°
The societal role of the business as an entity, however, is not
subject to a clearly acceptable definition.6' Often, the ethics of the
entity will necessarily differ from those of it's individual agents."
The goal of profit-making tends to fuel corporate agenda and to
sustain corporate growth, corporate agents must tailor their actions
to further profit-making ends.63 As one ethicists has noted:
For an individual to maintain this activity, and to succeed
against significant odds with hard competition, various virtues,
values, and attitudes come to the fore.., an energetic spirit, a
"bold front," a "can-do" mentality, loyalty, commitment,
optimism, positive thinking, self-control, self-discipline,
competitiveness, team playing, growth, material success,
concealment of one's strengths and intentions with regard to
one's competitors, distrust of competitors, self-protection,
survival, willingness to exploit the psychological and financial
weakness of one's competitors, and the importance of
winning. 61

Although a morally astute corporation cares about its
institutions . . ").
59. See Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, at sec. 6., p. 62
(Sun. Edition) (noting that the explosion in CEO pay over the past thirty years,
the building of houses for the superrich, with their size as not much smaller than
the White House, and the reemergence of yachts and personal servants has
fueled a re-concentration of income and wealth in the United States).
60. See id.
61. See Mayer, supra note 28, at 222-23.
62. See id. at 232 (noting that while a corporation may care about the state of
the community, any such caring, or even sense of corporate responsibility will
ultimately be overshadowed by the desire for accumulated profits).
63. See Rick Warzman, Nature or Nurture? Study Blames Ethical Lapses on
Corporate Goals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1987.
64. George Brenkert, The Corporation and Its Culture, 5 Bus. ETHIcs Q.
681-82 (1995)
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customers, the quality of its product, and the community which
supplies it with workers, tax concessions and limited liability, such
caring is ultimately limited by the internal pressure for
accumulated profits.65 Inevitably, tensions between the goals of the
community and bottom-line corporate agenda will arise.66
Those invisible corporate pressures guiding corporate
managers to circumvent public good for that of corporate profit
may similarly induce corporate lawyers to satisfy the managers in
the company that can hire and fire them. Corporations are no
longer chartered to meet and serve public needs and corporate
lawyers as hired guns are expected to pursue and defend corporate
agenda: profit maximization.67 Agreeing that corporations often
make good people do bad things, Ralph Estee, former senior
accountant with Arthur Anderson & Co., has noted that:
Even the most upright people are apt to become dishonest and
unmindful of their civic responsibilities when placed in a typical
corporate environment .... The culprit is not personal value
values are getting
but corporate culture .... People's personal
8
blocked by the needs of the corporation.1

Congress, however, is using its legislative power to go back in
time. New legislation now resembles old governing class mandates
65. Mayer, supra note 28, at 232 (noting that Ben and Jerry's is an excellent
example of a company with a strong sense of ethics, although such goodwill may
ultimately be subject to takeover pressures or a perceived need to "go public" in
order to survive in an ever changing market).
66. Id. at 233 (noting that this is consistent with the dynamics of general
moral decision-making in groups where dominant values compel individuals to
do things they would otherwise avoid doing).
67. See Pearce, supra note 14, at 397. Pearce quotes commentators who now
liken lawyers to business people, with one prominent lawyer noting that:
Our whole moral atmosphere is corrupted by a passion for sudden wealth. Can
the lawyer escape the moral influence which has proved so fatal to tradesmen,
to bankers, to all indeed in whom this passion is roused? His occupation brings
him into daily contact with them... How few are superior to the passion for
mere wealth without the terrible sacrifice its gain may demand.
SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN

PROFESSIONS 1750-1900 7-8, 223 (Chicago 1991).
68. Rick Wartzman, Nature or Nurture? Study Blames Ethical Lapses on
CorporateGoals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1987 (quoting Ralph Estee).
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of corporate lawyer's as defenders of the public good in order to
reclaim the kind of norm-generating communities that Dunfee,
Donaldson, and Fort have been campaigning for. Congress is
redrafting corporate agenda and remolding the corporate lawyer's
role in order to instill values and ethics that comport with new
communal standards, focusing less on material wealth, and more
on corporate lawyer accountability.
III. POLICING THE LEGAL PROFESSION

A. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Congress has responded to the perceived gaps in the current
corporate and legal regulatory framework. In an attempt to avoid
future Enron and WoldCom fiascos, Sarbanes-Oxley is designed to
make it more difficult for executives and corporate lawyers to
mislead investors about company performance.69 Sarbanes-Oxley
has been called the most significant securities legislation in more
than a generation.7' Among its stated objectives, Sarbanes-Oxley
aims to provide the financial markets with more timely,
transparent information and enhanced shareholder protection."
The provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley are by far "new" or novel to the
legal profession." Rather, they are merely restatements of conduct
previously characterized as illegal, but seldom enforced."
The Act requires lawyers to report evidence of a material
securities laws violation or breach of fiduciary duty to the74
company's general counsel or chief executive officer ("CEO").
The lawyer need not "know" for a fact of a violation, rather, the
reporting obligation would be triggered when a lawyer merely
69. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, Corporate-FraudLaw Forces Lawyers to Be
Whistle-Blowers, 1 No. 29 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 1, Aug. 2002.
70. See Maco, supra note 2.
71. See id.
72. Kane, supra note 13.
73. Id.
74. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2003). This reporting requirement seems to apply to
both in-house and outside legal counsel.
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"reasonably believes" that a violation has occurred, is occurring or
is about to occur.75 In the event that chief legal counsel agrees
about the suspected violation, the company would then be required
to adopt remedial measures and sanctions, including any
appropriate governmental disclosures. 6
Upon receipt of an appropriate response from head counsel
within a reasonable time, the reporting lawyer will be deemed to
have satisfied all obligations under the law.77 In the event that the
general counsel or CEO do not respond appropriately to the
presented evidence, the lawyer must then report the incident to the
company's board of directors or audit board.78 If the allegations
are not investigated by the board at this stage, the lawyer has the
option of making a "noisy withdrawal."79 To further compel
disclosure, reporting lawyers will not be held in violation of the
attorney-client privilege.'
The terms of Sarbanes-Oxley provides that the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") is responsible for administering
the new regulations to be in accordance with the statute's terms.
The SEC welcomed participation by the American Bar Association
("ABA") in implementing the new SEC rules for lawyers

75. See SEC Proposes New Rules for Attorneys of Public Companies, 8 No.
13 ANDRES SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 3, Nov. 20, 2002. However, ambiguities
certainly abound; when should a layer report alleged wrongdoing? How much
evidence triggers reporting? Is an uncorroborated report by a former employee,
or a wild, unsubstantiated allegation considered evidence?
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Although this provision is not codified as part of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
SEC instructs lawyers faced with board inaction to disavow any documents filed
by the agency, but to still look forward to protection from any alleged violations
of the attorney-client privilege. Id. A "noisy withdrawal" may nonetheless
become problematic for it places counsel in the role of a whistleblower, which
can ultimately erode the confidential aspect essential to the lawyer-client
relationship. Id. (quoting Harold Ruvoldt of Edwards & Angell).
80. Id. Where, however, the SEC is given the authority to exonerate lawyers
from the confidential rules of the attorney-client privilege is not addressed within
the Act.
81. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2003).
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practicing before it.82 SEC Commissioner Harvey Pitt stated that
the ABA's Corporate Responsibility Task Force ("Task Force"),
created in March, was as "an excellent example of how a
professional organization willing to work cooperatively and
voluntarily with us can help effect sensible reform."83 In issuing its
report just days before President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley
bill on July 30, 2002, the Task Force urged amendments to the
Model Rules to allow lawyers to more easily disclose wrongdoing
by corporations they represent.'
The Task Force recommended that corporate audit
committees, or other independent directors of the board, meet
regularly with general counsel in executive sessions." Additionally,
outside counsel should establish a direct line of communication
with general counsel, with an expectation that outside counsel will
inform the general counsel of violations or potential violations of
law.86 In concluding that outside directors, outside auditors, and
outside lawyers have fallen short in providing "active and informed
stewardship of the best interests of the corporation," the Task
Force's agenda is to modify and strengthen the current body of
ethical rules guiding lawyer conduct.87
82. See Podgers, supra note 13; Cahill, supra note 69.
83.
See Podgers, supra note 13.
84. See id.
See Villa, supra note 5.
85.
86. See id.
87. See id. Included in its recommended changes to the Model Rules, the
Task Force suggested a number of changes, including:
-Amending Model Rule 1.13 to make clear that the rule requires a lawyer to
pursue the remedial measures outline in Rule 1.13(c)(1) through (3), including
referring the matter to higher corporate authority, in a matter either related to
the lawyer's representation (as currently provided in the rule) or that has come
to the lawyer's attention through representation, where the misconduct by a
corporate officer, employee, or agent involves crime or fraud, including
violations of federal securities laws and regulations, and change both the text
and comments of Rule 1.13 to encourage counsel to take action to prevent or
rectify corporate misconduct (the Task Force believes that the current rule
unduly discourages such action by counsel);
-Extending permissible disclosure of confidential information under Model
Rule 1.6 to reach conduct that has resulted or is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and require
disclosure under Model Rule 1.6 to prevent felonies or other serious crimes,
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B. Rules 1.13 and 1.6 of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct
What Sarbanes-Oxley attempted to address, and what the
Task Force is aiming to reform, are perceived faults within the
ethical rules for lawyers.
Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") states that the lawyer's
allegiance is to the corporation as an "entity" and not the
constituents comprising the corporation." As a result, lawyer
deference to policy choices rendered by the corporation's
constituents, regardless of prudence, is mandated.". Rule 1.13 vests
broad policy objective determination within the domain of
corporate agents and charges the lawyer with merely the technical
and tactical responsibilities of carrying out such objectives, absent
any suspicion of illegal or fraudulent agent conduct."

The detached lawyer's role to corporate agent decisionmaking ends where the corporate entity may be undermined
through illegal actions likely to cause the entity substantial injury.9
Specifically, Rule 1.13 imposes a mandatory duty on corporate
including violations of the federal securities laws (the Task Force criticizes the
current rule for being permissive rather than mandatory);
-Expansion of rules 1.2(d), 1.13, and 4.1 to reach beyond actual knowledge to
circumstances in which the lawyer reasonably should know of the crime or the
fraud;
-Improving the linkage among the Model Rules relating to a lawyer's
obligations when faced with illegal conduct or break of fiduciary duty in
representing a corporate client.
Id.
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (1983). The Model Rules
have been adopted by a majority of states. See Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and
Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 959, 962 (1991). Through the
promulgation of standards of ethical conduct, the ABA is a significant voice in
defining a lawyer's proper role within the legal system. Id. Although the ultimate
authority to adopt ethical codes rests with each respective state, virtually all
lawyers and courts agree that lawyers have some sort of a generic duty to the
legal system as a whole, even though such duty is often at odds with the client,
with the broad, amorphous "legal system" or public interest, and inevitably, with
oneself. Id. at 963.
89.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13, COMMENT 4; Pietrusiak,

Jr., supra note 11, at 225.
90. See Pietrusiak, Jr., supra note 11, at 225.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13.
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counsel to take action in preventing a corporate director or officer
from engaging in illegal conduct that is "likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization. '9 2 Unlike the loose
knowledge standard imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley,9" the mandate of
Rule 1.13 applies only if the lawyer has knowledge that a corporate
agent is engaging in or intends to engage in misconduct.94
Underlying this rule is the notion that constituents within the
corporate entity are not considered the layer's "clients" outside
standard corporate policy decisions.95 Rule 1.13 allows lawyers to
disclose statements of a corporate agent, even if made with a
perceived sense of confidential protection, by reporting
wrongdoing to the highest authorities within the corporation.96
However, lawyers are not permitted to blow the whistle on the
corporation itself.' If no one within the corporation is willing to
act on the lawyer's disclosures, the lawyer faces only one option:
withdrawal from representation. 8
However, the options for corporate lawyers faced with
corporate wrongdoing were not always so limited. Prior to the
ABA's adoption of the Model Rules in 1983, existing ethical rules
permitted lawyers to disclose any prospective crime of a client,
regardless of its degree." The Model Rules once allowed a lawyer
to "reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime."" Ultimately, the
rules where modified and Model Rule 1.6 limited disclosure where
the lawyer is "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm."'' As currently promulgated, Model Rule
92. Id.
93. See supra Part III.A.
94. The Model Rules defines "knows" as "actual knowledge of the fact in
question." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13.
95. Pietrusiak, Jr., supra note 11, at 225.
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13.
97. See id.; see also Reich & Wirtner, supra note 1.
98. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13; see also Reich &
Wirtner, supra note 1.
99. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(3) (1980).
100. Id.
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6. In August 2002, a proposed
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1.6(b) only permits lawyers to reveal confidential client
information to the extent necessary to prevent the commission of a
crime that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. 2
Rule 1.6(b) does not authorize lawyers to blow the whistle on a
client who perpetrates, or plans to perpetrate, fraud likely to result

in substantial financialinjury to third parties.' °3
The promulgation of the Model Rules, partly in an attempt to
restore public confidence in the legal profession, seemingly provide
clear and reasoned guidelines required for the self-regulation of
the legal profession. 104 Model Rule 1.13 suggests a number of ways
in which a lawyer, who is suspecting harm to an organizational
client as a result of illegal agent conduct, could act, including
reporting the illegal conduct to the organization's board, or a
responsible constituent.
Nowhere, however, does the rule
amendment to Model Rule 1.6, permitting discretionary disclosure of financial
harm to third parties, was announced at the ABA Annual Meeting, but
ultimately withdrawn. See Pietrusiak, Jr., supra note 11, at 222. This proposal
illustrates how The American Bar Association ("ABA") is constantly attempting
to keep abreast of the rapidly changing legal profession. For example, the ABA
Canons of 1908 regulated the ethical considerations between the general-practice
lawyer and a flesh-and-blood client seeking advise on a specifically-defined legal
issue. See id. However, as an abundance of lawyers shifted to representing
corporate clients, the typical attorney-client model was challenged and the
Canons became quickly outdated. See id- Responding to pressure to redraft
ethical standards to bring them in accordance with contemporary legal work
realities, in 1969, the ABA promulgated the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). See id. Critics nonetheless argued that the Code was
archaic in that it was based on the traditional assumptions of the attorney-client
relationship prevalent in the Canons of 1908. See id.
In its first attempt to address the client-identity problems lawyers face when
representing corporate clients, the ABA released the Code's Ethical
Consideration ("EC") 5-18, informing lawyers employed by an organization that
their allegiance extended to the entity and not to individual constituents, such as
stockholders or employees. Id. EC 5-18 was nonetheless criticized for its failure
to adequately define the corporate "entity" and for its failure to recognize the
entity as a byproduct of its agents' actions, all of whom may hold different, and
possibly conflicting interests. See id.at 223.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6.
103. Id.
104. See Pietrusiak, Jr., supra note 11, at 228.
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13.
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require a lawyer to follow a specific course of action.
However, public outrage towards recent corporate scandals,
and the potential for corporate lawyer involvement in these
scandals, has tested the effectiveness of these self-regulation
policies as a means to maintain public confidence in the legal
profession."° In principle response to the general consensus that
the current self-regulation mechanism of the legal profession has
failed, Congress has gladly assumed the responsibility of expanding
traditional contours of corporate-lawyer liability for lawyers whose
clients are implicated in corporate scandals. 7
IV. THE NEW MANDATED ROLE OF THE CORPORATE LAWYER
At first glance, Sarbanes-Oxley does not appear to alter the
reality that a lawyer's duty of loyalty lies with the corporation as an
entity, rather than with the entities' constituents. However, what it
does appear to alter, or in fact what it actually begins to create, are
duties of corporate lawyer loyalty to outsiders of the corporate
entity.
Traditionally, lawyers are granted the luxury of talking freely
with anyone within the company they represent about anything. 8
Now, corporate lawyers who take no action when confronted with
a client's fraud will certainly face significant liability, and
potentially expose members of the investing public to significant
financial losses."° Sarbanes-Oxley revamps the scope of lawyer
liability and now beholds lawyers to the investing public, market
regulators and the government.
In practically deputizing lawyers as quasi-governmental
inspectors, some argue that Sarbanes-Oxley cuts right at the heart
of the attorney-client relationship."0
Although lawyers are
106.

See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 1; Villa, supra note 5; Kane, supra note

13.
107. See Podgers, supra note 13.
108. See Renee Deger, Lawyers Gird for Fight over New SEC Rules Biggest
Fear Is That Attorney-Client Privilege May Be Compromised, S.F. RECORDER,
Nov. 7, 2002, at 1.
109. See Reich & Wirtner, supra note 1.
110. See Deger, supra note 108.
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retained as hired guns for the corporate entity, those comprising

the entity are its agents. "' Corporate lawyers must interact and
communicate with such agents in order to zealously advocate for
the entity's interests."' Sarbanes-Oxley may likely chill the flow of
communication between corporate executives and counsel,113 for
corporate agents will fear that future litigation may compel lawyer
disclosure. Consequently, a lack of candor and forthrightness by

corporate executives in their relationships with their lawyers, and
subsequent flawed legal advice may inevitably ensue."'
Although the Model Rules do not currently mandate that
lawyers disclose confidential client information to prevent or
rectify financial injury to third parties, Sarbanes-Oxley nonetheless
facilitates prosecution by regulatory authorities and civil suits by
third parties who have suffered damages against those lawyers who
fail to disclose."' Without the threat of lawyer disclosure, devious
corporate agents will likely be more susceptible to stray from the
law. However, expanding the latitude of lawyers who disclose
corporate client transgressions will likely curb the wave of
government regulation, and place lawyers in a better position to
protect themselves from financial or criminal liability.
Disclosure requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley may even allow

111. See generally discussion supra Part III.B.
112. See generally Cahill, supra note 69.
113. Compare Statement of Koji F. Fukumura, co-chair of the ABA
Litigations Section's Securities Committee (stating that lower level management
"will be afraid of seeking advise, because the expectation they will have is the
lawyer will immediately turn around and tell the CEO or general counsel. I
envision a chilling of communications at the lower level, because a lot of times
when you're working on due diligence or a transaction, the success of which may
have a material impact on the financial condition of the company, you're not
dealing with the CEO on a day-to-day basis. You're dealing with someone below
that."), with Statement of Michael Roster, past Chair of the American Corporate
Counsel Association (stating that "[w]e need a system where officers, directors,
employees and companies feel very comfortable seeking in-house legal advice. It
would be a terrible mistake to ever cut that off. Based on what I understand
about the legislation, I don't think it changes much of that at all."), in Cahill,
supra note 69.
114. See Cahill, supra note 69.
115. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2003).
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corporate lawyers to better serve the corporate entity. A lawyer
should be obligated to inform a corporate client's directors of
ongoing illegal conduct that senior management fails to rectify.
Directors have the right to be aware of illegal corporate conduct
and consequences of that conduct. Since a corporation is run by or
under the authority of its board of directors," ' it can be argued that
a corporate lawyer should be ethically bound to communicate with
corporate directors, the highest authority within a corporate entity,
about matters regarding the entity's representation of which they
should be keenly aware. Corporations should not employ their
lawyer's services to pursue criminal or fraudulent conduct and
reporting requirements allow lawyers to better comply with their
ethical obligations when serving corporate clients.
Acknowledging that America lacks a national standard of legal
ethics,"' Sarbanes-Oxley now calls for the SEC to determine
appropriate regulatory conduct."' As if adhering to a mandated,
governmentally defined role wasn't novel enough, the underlying
policy of Sarbanes-Oxley summons the legal profession to retreat
to a role abandoned nearly a century ago. The guiding principle
behind the reporting requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley comports
with the original understanding of lawyers as America's governing
class. The loyalty of corporate lawyers is now shifting-from the
corporate entity to the investing public. The corporate lawyer who
is aware of corporate scandal is now obligated to uphold the
common good by disclosing information obtained in the course of
the attorney-client relationship."9
The traditional understanding of the American lawyer's role as
that of governing class is beginning to reemerge. In the wake of
recent corporate scandals, the government is now beginning to
legislate that a corporate lawyer's civic duty is to uphold societal
public good. Lawyers operating within the confines of a business
entity should nonetheless do so with corporate social responsibility
in mind. Dunfee and Donaldson's ISCT theory'" now has some
116.

See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW 141(A).

117.

See McMorrow, supra note 88 at 962.

118.

15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.

119.
120.

Id.
See Mayer, supra note 28, at 217.
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standing, for recent Congressional enactments are forcing
corporations to mold business practices in conformity with
communal norms.
Fort must also be equally satisfied, for the public now yearns
for corporations to serve as their mediating institution between the
suppression of corporate misconduct and the promotion of public
good. No longer will corporate attorneys be allowed to turn a
blind eye to questionable corporate conduct. While lawyers will
unlikely be subjected to discipline for simple unawareness, they
will no longer be permitted to ignore obvious corporate
wrongdoing.'
Sarbanes-Oxley has served to satisfy Congress, investors and
the community. Unfortunately, corporate lawyers may go to work
confused and displaced, for they were accustomed to their role as
zealous advocate for the corporate entity. The Model Rules
further codified this accustomed view by assuring corporate
lawyers that their sole loyalty did not extend beyond the corporate
entity to outsiders. 2
CONCLUSION

American lawyers are no longer behaving like stewards of
republicanism. The corporations they represent are turning into
cutthroat capitalist enterprises, with executive compensation
packages growing lavishly by the minute." The obsession with
increased consumption has led many seemingly sound institutions
down the path of corporate collapse.
However, communal
expectations have changed, and no longer will corporate
accumulation of wealth at the expense of public and investor
financial loss be tolerated. Congress has responded to recent
corporate debacles and is ready to police an industry that is
perceived as failing to uphold its own policing standards. 4
121. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
122. See generally discussion supra Parts II.B, III.B.
123. See Krugman, supra note 59.
124. "With Enron and WorldCom, and all the other corporate misconduct we
have seen, it is again clear that corporate lawyers should not be left to regulate
themselves no more than accountants should be left to regulate themselves."
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The fall of Enron has fueled Congressional alteration of
familiar corporate lawyer settings by imposing and defining new
communal and public duties. The enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley
will inevitably heighten the tension between the newly mandated
corporate lawyer's role as defender of communal values and the
presently accepted role as that of hired-gun. Once again, the
public good is to trump financial self-interest or client loyalty.

Reich & Wirtner, supra note 1 (statement of Senator John Edwards of North
Carolina during Senate debate over Sarbanes-Oxley).
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